

Foucault and the Problem of Genealogy

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Among the theorists who have contributed to the practice of history “after the linguistic turn,” as the current phrase goes, perhaps the most influential and durable, at least among historians, has been Michel Foucault. In no small part, this is attributable to the fact that Foucault committed himself to working through the implications of his structuralist and post-structuralist views on language, discourse, and knowledge-power via a minute examination of a variety of historical phenomena that fell within the purview of his understanding of the growth of a disciplinary society in early modern Europe. At the same time, Foucault’s theoretical initiatives, as they appeared serially in works such as The Order of Things and The Archeology of Knowledge, set forth epistemological positions that were more – if never entirely – compatible with the ways that historians normally think and work than did, for example Derridean Deconstruction. Of late, Foucault’s deployment of the notion of genealogy in treating the past, a fundamental characteristic of his thought from the early seventies on, has come to the fore in a range of works dedicated to tracings patterns and/or traditions of thought over both the short and the long term.

This article represents an attempt to explain to myself my failure to grasp the full implications of Foucault’s use of genealogy as the basis of his philosophical investment in history, despite -- or rather, I suspect, because of -- a long involvement on my part with questions of genealogy. Having devoted a not insignificant portion of my early work on medieval historiography to the structure and function of genealogies in Latin and Old French historical writings of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, I found myself continually perplexed in the face of Foucault’s reliance on genealogy as a solvent of historical continuity and linearity, his view of genealogy as aleatory, contingent, potentially disruptive and delegitimising. Yet, lest this seem an inexcusable self-indulgence, I would like to suggest that my perplexity and confusion has some heuristic value, and may help us to consider more carefully the relevance and/or applicability for thinking about the Middle Ages of Foucauldian genealogical models currently much in evidence. To do this, I need to review the characteristics of medieval genealogical

thought, before turning to the ways in which Foucault has fundamentally revised the meaning of genealogy in our times. I will begin, then, with a brief review of medieval genealogical thinking as it appears in medieval historiography, with an apology to those already familiar with the basic points that will be outlined here.

The vital characteristic of genealogy in its medieval phase, I believe, lies in its ability to address not only the historical realities of a family's past, but its symbolic aspirations as well.† This binary capacity of genealogy, to be at once historical and symbolic, has its most telling exemplum in the opening chapter of the Gospel According to St.†Matthew where Christ, the son of God, is nevertheless furnished with a patrilineal genealogy (via David) fit, as indeed He was meant to be, for a king.† Such manipulation of genealogical data for symbolic causes in the most fundamental text of medieval society is as good an index as any of the range of human action, beliefs, and values that could be subsumed within a genealogical perspective during the Middle Ages.

As a specifically historiographical phenomenon, genealogy intrudes into historical narrative at precisely the time when noble families in France were beginning to organise themselves into vertical structures based on agnatic consanguinity, to take the form, in other words, of patrilineal lignages, representing, while regulating, the transmission of family name, title, and patrimony from father to son.¹ Some twenty genealogical histories from the late tenth to mid-twelfth century have come down to us and, despite incidental narrative differences, they broadly share a common pattern in their identification of the salient features of both the family's structure and significant deeds.† Strikingly, in these histories, although the family lineage is traced primarily through the male line, that is, through the succeeding generations of counts or castellans who constitute the trunks of the family tree, the founder-hero of the line is usually of lower social rank than the female, so that the social capital of the family resides, ultimately, on the maternal side.† It is the woman's illicit union with a knight-adventurer that generates both the titular head of the lineage and which provides for the final legitimation of the family and its appropriation of those lands and honors that establish the political power and social prestige of the dynasty.† After the period of foundation, the chronicle then traces descent primarily along patrilineal

lines, recording the transmission of family name, title, and patrimony from father to son, so that the family appears to be organised as a vertical structure based on agnatic consanguinity.

In seeking to explain the rise and proliferation of genealogical chronicles in the High Middle Ages, historians have generally connected them to actual changes taking place in the structure of the medieval family, brought about by the emergence of primogeniture from the late eleventh century on.[†] As property came to be transmitted exclusively from father to oldest son, the dominant feature of family structure followed the line marked by the handing down of the patrimony, and descent, like inheritance, was increasingly focused on the recipient of the family honor as the bearer of the family line.[†]The representation of lineage thus became primarily a representation of the transmission of lands, ignoring the remaining members of the biological family not included in the patrimonial inheritance.

Genealogy was both cause and consequence of this development, for its appearance as a literary genre in the eleventh and twelfth century marked the lineage's consciousness of itself and, to a certain extent, as Duby has remarked, was able to create this consciousness and to impose it on members of the lineage group.² Written above all to exalt a line and legitimise its power, a medieval genealogy displays a family's consciousness of itself and its importance and, as Genicot has demonstrated, signals the family's intention to affirm and extend its place in political life.^{3†} Even here, in its simplest form, most closely linked to the social realities of the family, medieval genealogies passed easily into ideological statement, symbolising a family's claim, real or imagined, to political authority and prestige.

It is this latter motive which probably accounts for the invention of mythical ancestors, linked, almost invariably, to royal Carolingian progenitors, for the descent from royalty -- even through the female line -- served to underscore the nobility of the agnatic lineage.[†] Thus, the twelfth-century aristocratic family, once geographically settled and in possession of land, castle, and family name, began to temporalise itself in terms of an uninterrupted lineal ascent stretching from a heroic foundation in a mythical past, down through successive generations of male inheritors of the family patrimony, to the present representative of the line.[†] In this way,

the family asserted its identity through the fictionalisation of its past, validating the family's legitimacy by means of genealogical descent from an heroic founder.† The genealogical histories so created were clearly designed to authenticate the family's title to power, and did so by connecting the family to a royal tradition, a strategy made possible by the persistence of families with Carolingian roots in the northern and western parts of France.† In effect, the family rejects its own (genuine) past in favor of an invented one, one which draws on the social prestige to be garnered from association with illustrious forbearers, borrowing royal history as the prototype for the shaping of its own history.

If such was the character of genealogical histories in northern France in the High Middle Ages, the question still remains:†what, if anything, is their symbolic function?†To understand this, we need to look at the literary form of the histories and, more particularly, at their narrative structure. My focus on the narrative structure of such histories can be justified on two principal grounds.† First, on the pragmatic ground that a history's narrative design is that element of its literary strategy most likely to disclose its ideological intentions and thus to reveal its symbolic nature.† Second, because the narrative aspect of a literary text is, as Northrop Frye has repeatedly reminded us, 'a recurrent act of symbolic communication, in other words, a ritual.'⁴ By ritual, Frye here means a verbal imitation of human action as a whole, a mimesis.† And to differentiate this verbal mimesis from liturgical reenactment, Frye employs for the former the term mythos (which, of course, he gets from Aristotle) -- what in fictional genres we call 'plot,' and what in historical writing serves to convey the universal in history through the very shape of the historical narrative.⁵ Thus, to say that genealogical chronicles assume a symbolic function, it is necessary to argue that the historical narrative of any given text is emplotted as a genealogy; in other words, that genealogy becomes for historiography not only a thematic 'myth' but a narrative mythos, a symbolic form that governs the patterning of the historical narrative. For it is genealogy as symbolic form, conceptual metaphor, which had the greatest impact on the patterning of historical narrative and the formation of its expressive meaning. †If this is true, then an analysis of narrative structure offers the best opportunity to

test the genuinely symbolic qualities of genealogically influenced historiography in twelfth- and thirteenth-century France.

There are two principal ways in which genealogy as symbolic form affected historical narratives in twelfth and thirteenth-century France.† First, as form, by supplying a model for the disposition of narrative material; second, as meaning, by reinterpreting events in accordance with the model of filiation suggested by genealogy. As a formal structure, genealogy deploys history as a series of biographies linked by the principle of hereditary succession,⁶ which succession stands as much for the passing of time as for a legal notion of transference.† In such chronicles, as R.†Howard Bloch has shown, ‘the family line and the historical line coincide...the order of the family determines the order of the text.’⁷ From a strictly generic point of view, this manner of ordering history represents a conflation between the theoretically distinct genres of vita and chronography. It produces a narrative order based on genealogical succession, in which the most significant structural divisions of history are supplied by generational change, resulting in a narrative controlled by dynastic, rather than annalistic or chronological time.⁸ In this sense, the myth of genealogical continuity becomes the historical mythos in Northrop Frye's meaning of narrative structure, and emplots history as genealogy.

Genealogy employed as a narrative frame not only affected the chroniclers' organization of the chronological time of his history.† On a deeper level, genealogy functioned to secularise time by grounding it in biology, transforming the connection between past and present into a ‘real’ one, seminally imparted from generation to generation.† On a biological model, the series temporum which it was the duty of every chronicler to record becomes an interconnected succession of past moments in which time, become human, is historicised.

Insofar as medieval chroniclers remained faithful to the human, biological significance of their genealogies, they could perceive relationships between historical figures and events in the past as part of one continuous stream of history.† The procreative process by which human beings engender successive generations is the human shape of history generating events over time, events which stand in a filiative relation to one another that mirrors the reproductive

course of human life.⁹ In this way, genealogy provided medieval chroniclers with a metaphor of procreative time and social affiliation that made it possible for them to bring into a connected historical matrix the core of their material and to organise their narratives as a succession of gestes performed by the successive representatives of one or more lignages, whose personal characteristics and deeds, extensively chronicled in essentially biographical modes, bespoke the enduring meaning of history as the collective action of noble lineages in relation to one another and to those values to which their gestes gave life. Indeed, the ideal character of the historical portraiture to which genealogically oriented histories were given had the effect of reducing the plethoric variety and variability of human persons and occurrences to a canon of eternally repeated gestes, fundamentally homogeneous in nature and isomorphic in form.† It is as if the synchronic assemblage of meaningful acts which history can and should relate were diachronically projected onto the screen of the past, without at the same time losing their archetypal character.†¹⁰

But that is not all.†What is particularly interesting about these genealogical chronicles -- internally structured, we should remember, as agnatic lineages focused on the transmission of property, name, and status from father to son -- and what connects them directly to the central generative myths in Christianity, is the extent to which they replicate the patrilineal origin of mankind itself.† As recounted in Genesis, God creates man (Adam), from whom alone woman (Eve) derives.† This patrilineal generation, of course, is repeated in the regeneration of mankind through the creation of the (new) man, Christ, this time explicitly designated as a son to God, also explicitly designated as God the Father.†Like the female ancestor whose illicit, i.e.†non-marital, union with the hero-founder of the line stands at the origin of the agnatic lineage, Mary's collaboration with God serves to create the founder and redeemer of a new humanity.†Here, too, there is a rejection of a presumptive, known, human paternity (via Joseph -- the record of which is nonetheless preserved in Matthew's recounting of Christ's human genealogy), in favor of a more exalted (literally and figuratively) lineage. Moreover, Mary's collaboration with God in the creation of the new man, is specifically construed to be non-

generative, since she remains a Virgin, thus further underlining the exclusively patrilineal principle of generativity so prominent in Judeo-Christian theology.†(The counterpart in the Old Testament is found in Abraham and Sarah, since Sarah is sterile and requires the miraculous intervention of God to procreate Isaac, the first of the lineal descendants of the Jews of Abraham's God).

To the extent that medieval genealogical histories replicate this pattern of patrilineal generation (and I think they largely do), they are, from a structural point of view, narrative mimeses of the creation of life itself and as such acquire a genuinely paradigmatic character as imitations of the supernatural order upon which the social order of the human community is based.† Historical myth and historiographical mythos are one and the same expression of an underlying Christian metaphysics which explains the generation of mankind in patriarchal terms, and which thereby seeks a supernatural foundation for the continuance of patriarchy as an exemplary structure of social order. To sum up then: medieval genealogy is linear in structure, legitimizing in function, identitarian in politics, seminal in substance and metaphysical in meaning. Could anything be further from Foucault?

In turning to Foucault, I take as my basic text his important essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' first published in Hommage à Jean Hyppolite in 1971¹¹ and translated into English in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, together with the text of his course given at the Collège de France during the academic year 1975-1976, recently published under the title "Il Faut Défendre La Société." This latter text represents a turning point in Foucault's thought, a movement away from the phase of explicating the modes and mechanisms of disciplinary societies and the operation of the complex knowledge-power, and towards his later concern with "the care of the self" as it appears in the final works on the history of sexuality. "Il Faut Défendre la Société" stands midpoint between these poles of Foucault's intellectual trajectory, and takes up the question of racism -- a question rather quickly abandoned by Foucault -- thus representing a odd, indeed uncharacteristic, moment in the unfolding of his thought. But precisely because racism entailed for Foucault the larger landscape of bio-politics, he dedicated

the first lecture to issues of genealogy, inescapably given the broader question that was his quarry.

As many commentators have recognised, Foucault's essay on 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' was one that, in the words of Michael Roth, 'would define his historical approach to discursive practices for the rest of his life.'¹² In it, he seeks to articulate his fundamental perspective on history, a perspective that is as anti-Hegelian (that is, anti-metaphysical) as it is pro-Nietzschean. To that end, Foucault begins by distinguishing between a sens de l'histoire, a sense of history and its tendencies, which he identifies with the Hegelian, metaphysical search for essence and telos, and a sens historique, which he defines as a sense of the 'singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality,'¹³ requiring patience and a knowledge of details, constructed from discrete and apparently insignificant truths. It is for this reason that the Nietzschean genealogist must become a historian, for genealogy does not oppose itself to history, but rather to the [Hegelian] 'meta-historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies.'¹⁴ (And it for this reason as well, I suspect, that Foucault the philosopher committed himself to working out the implications of his anti-metaphysical postmodernism within history). Genealogy opposes itself not to history but to the search for origins [Ursprung]. Having abandoned faith in metaphysics, the genealogist who listens to history discovers that behind things there is not a timeless and essential secret, but only the secret that things have no essence, or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.¹⁵ What is found, therefore, at the beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin, but rather the 'dissension of other things', that is, disparity, heterogeneity. ['otherness' / alterity] The genealogist requires history to dispel the 'chimera of the origin' and in so doing, history itself becomes profoundly genealogical in the sense that it concerns itself not with steady progress and truth, but instead becomes cognizant of a concrete body of development, with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its losses, surprises, jolts and unpalatable defeats -- the basis, says Foucault, 'of all beginnings, atavisms, and heredities.'¹⁶

It is on the question of 'heredity' proper, what Nietzsche distinguished as Herkunft -- the equivalent of stock or descent (vs. origin/ Ursprung) -- that Foucault makes his most important intervention into the problem of genealogy, for it is here that Foucault contests both the search for identity in the past and the very possibility of a historical 'science.' Foucault acknowledges that Herkunft involves a consideration of race or social type, but, he insists, such 'descent' is not a category of resemblance; this 'origin' produces only difference, the sorting out of disparate traits. Rather than stipulating origin as identity, the search for descent, in Foucault's now famous phrase

is not the erecting of foundations. It disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself.¹⁷

At once anti-foundational and anti-identitarian, a genuinely genealogical investigation of descent cannot generate a coherent identity for the self, for the numberless beginnings it finds lead only to the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.¹⁸ Genealogy as an analysis of descent thus discloses the self as a body totally imprinted by history, hence subject to its unstable assembly of faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layers that 'threaten the fragile inheritor from within or from underneath.'¹⁹ Far from legitimising the self as the end-point of an originary movement, genealogy discloses the contingent nature of descent and subjects the self to the endless play of events, dominations, and the exteriority of accidents. Foucauldian genealogy does not legitimise, but rather de-legitimises by de-naturing, by demonstrating the historically constructed character of persons and things, thus bracketing the bio-filiative core of the traditional model of genealogy as we found it, for example, in medieval texts.

And it is precisely this radical form of historicisation, the discovery of the contingent, accidental, non-foundational and, above all, non-linear and non-evolutionary nature of history itself that makes any traditional understanding of history as 'science', 'knowledge', metaphysical or evolutionary schemata, ultimately impossible. On this point Foucault is

decisive: a historical genealogy (or a genealogically inflected history) does not 'go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things... it does not resemble the evolution of a species nor map the destiny of a people.' On the contrary, to follow the complex course of descent, Foucault tells us, 'is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion;' it is to discover that truth or being 'do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but [only] the exteriority of accidents.'²⁰ The literary product of history conceived as dispersion is, therefore, not the connected, continuous and coherent narrative at which nineteenth-century historicism aimed, but a series of isolated 'scenes' that expose the multiple points of emergence (Entstehung, once more vs. Ursprung/origin) embedded within the drama of an endlessly repeated play of dominations through which events were (and are) formed.²¹ Such 'scenes' disclose the radically historical (hence anti-metaphysical) nature of human endeavor and development, and introduce (or, more accurately) restore discontinuity into our very being, since the forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard conflicts, the singular randomness of events that genealogy teaches the historian to observe. Thus the product of the genealogist's patient attentiveness to history is not a new positivism, in the ordinary sense of the term. The genealogies born of local understandings, of discontinuous, disqualified, non-legitimizing fragments of knowledge, are, as Foucault stipulates most clearly in "Il Faut défendre la Société", 'anti-sciences.' Indeed, it is exactly against the effects of power that accrue to a discourse considered to be 'scientific' that genealogy struggles.²² Genealogy demands a battle of knowledge against the 'power effects' of scientific discourse and takes its place in this battle as a tactic, deployed to put into play the forms of knowledge (savoirs) thus engaged, as a result of which they are 'desubjugated' and rendered free.²³ The stake in this battle is to determine what are the mechanisms, the effects, relations, dispositions of power that are exercised on different levels in different societies, and within their multiple domains and extensions. In short, at stake is the historical understanding of the various and variegated character of different, historically generated, technologies of knowledge.

A historical practice so conceived, according to Foucault, becomes 'effective' in Nietzsche's sense of wirkliche historie (in effect, Nietzsche's term for genealogy), to the extent that it becomes a differential knowledge that disavows all search for continuity or legitimacy, abandons the illusion of both foundation and finality, and deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature. It is a practice 'not made for understanding but for cutting,'²⁴ one which navigates without landmarks or points of reference.

Effective history, according to Foucault, has three 'uses' that bring it into stark opposition to the traditional aims and modalities of historiography. 1) The first is parodic, and is directed against reality, opposing the theme of history as reminiscence or recognition. 2) The second is dissociative, and is directed against identity, opposing history as given continuity or on-going tradition. 3) The third is 'sacrificial', and is directed against truth, opposing history as knowledge, the sacrifice here constituted by, I understand Foucault to be saying, the very subject of knowledge. All three imply a use of history that severs its connection to memory, or to any metaphysical or anthropological model, in place of which it constructs a counter-memory and, in disconnecting the present from the past, effectively becomes counter-historical as well, one of the finer paradoxes of Foucault's historicizing philosophy. For just as there is no origin, foundation, stable self or identity, neither is there a uniform, continuous past with a univocal meaning for the present. All knowledge, as Foucault's radical historicist position defines it, is local, periodic, and discontinuous, (hence fragmentary), a by-product of interpretation rather than nature. Change, the object of the historian's desire to know, is what happens between archives, that is, between historically differentiated epistemic regimes [and discourses],²⁵ and thus unavailable for historical analysis as such.†

Given the stark difference between medieval genealogical thought and that of Foucault, it seems almost supernumerary to attempt to summarise their main points of distinction from one another, but it is perhaps useful to insist on them any way. Where medieval genealogy seeks to legitimise, Foucault seeks to de-legitimise; where medieval genealogy is heroic in aim and metaphorical in language, producing abstract reduction and synthetic mimesis ,

Foucauldian genealogy is critical and ironic, aiming at tactical dispersion and historical fragmentation; the one is metaphysical, the other anti-metaphysical (i.e. "genealogical") ; where the former is seminal, the latter is semiotic; and, most important, where medieval genealogy seeks authoritative identity in a continuous relation to hereditary descent, Foucauldian genealogy denies the very possibility of any search for identity in the past, and dissolves the very notion of self as a unit of history and/or analysis. Small wonder that the historian dedicated to understanding the form and function of medieval genealogy would find Foucault's genealogical conspectus illegible.

But, I would submit, part of the reason for the illegibility of Foucault from a medieval perspective, is that what intervenes between the Middle Ages and the modern/postmodern age(s) is an absolutely new technology of knowledge-power that first appeared in the 17th and 18th centuries (Foucault is notoriously vague on the dating of this change in all his works). This new technology of knowledge is nothing less than the rise of a disciplinary discourse, and it is the novelty of this appearance that Foucault underscores in "Il Faut Défendre la Société":

In the 17th and 18th century an important phenomenon was produced: the appearance - one should more correctly say the invention -- of a **new** mechanism of power, which has very special, particular procedures, wholly new instruments, an apparatus completely different and, I [Foucault] believe, absolutely incompatible with those at work under the relations of power characteristic of regimes of sovereignty.²⁶

It is the novelty of the disciplinary discourse on which Foucault here (and everywhere) insists, a novelty that is not so much epistemological as technological. Indeed, one of the telling peculiarities of Foucault's thought generally is the degree to which medieval regimes operating under the banner of sovereignty seem to escape the fate of those knowledge-power systems so characteristic of the "modern" world. To be sure, every society falls within some epistemic regime. But in comparison to modernity, the Middle Ages tends to be presented by Foucault as a free, untrammled period, a time when reason speaks to unreason, when torture is writ upon

the body rather than the soul, when, in effect, the leper colony may be inhabited solely by lepers, but it is routinely visited by holy kings such as Saint Louis. In this view of the Middle Ages, Foucault left undisturbed the basic narrative of modernity, which viewed the origin of modern regimes, both epistemic and disciplinary, as the product of a distinctly postmedieval world. The effect was to leave essentially unchanged an organicist conception of the Middle Ages, a shadowy totality against which Foucault's anti-totalizing readings of the past -- of history as "dispersion" -- could be staged.

The question then becomes: are the concepts derived from a Foucauldian analysis of disciplinary discourse applicable to pre-modern societies, given that his very notion of genealogy insists that he himself writes from within a particular -- in this case, postmodern -- technology of knowledge. In "Il Faut Défendre la Société", Foucault's answer would appear to be a decisive "no," and to the extent that we wish to remain faithful to his formulation of the problem (which is by no means necessary), that is to say, to remain sensitive to the differential technologies of knowledge that Foucault spent a lifetime describing, it would seem to disallow any easy transfer of Foucauldian concepts -- genealogical or otherwise -- to the analysis of medieval society.

I have stressed the notion of technologies of knowledge, rather than epistemologies, because I think it underscores the historical specificity of the disciplinary mechanism, whose genealogy cannot, as all Foucault's genealogical writings make obvious, be traced continuously back to a distant past , whether medieval or ancient or early modern. Indeed, the very point of Foucauldian genealogical analysis is to foreclose, as we have seen, the possibility of constructing precisely such a descent. In contrast to psychoanalysis, which purports to tell us how the mind, as such, is structured, or to Deconstruction, which seeks to elaborate the universal operations of language (this is how language works, according to Deconstruction), Foucauldian history, like post-colonialism, stipulates local genesis and definite contexts in which period-specific modalities of knowledge, power, thought , epistemologies and technologies are put into play in the societies analyzed. Foucault would doubtless be the first

to say that knowledge of medieval genealogy is of no help in understanding his use of genealogy, and the question I would put on the table here is whether or not the reverse is also true: Can Foucauldian genealogy be applied to the Middle Ages without doing violence to its internal logic and its embeddedness within the precise postmodern technologies of thought from which it emerges? That is a question of wide theoretical import, and one which we would do well, I think, to ponder.

Footnotes

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- ¹1. See Georges Duby, 'Remarques sur la littérature généalogique en France au XIe et XIIe siècles,' and "Structures de parenté et noblesse dans la France du nord aux XI et XIIe siècles,' both in Hommes et Structures du Moyen Age (Paris, 1973).
- ²2. 'Structures de parenté et noblesse dans la France du nord aux XIe et XII siècles,' p.†268.
- ³3. Léopold Genicot, Les Généalogies [Typologie des Sources du Moyen Age] (Turnout, 1975), p.†36.
- ⁴5. Anatomy of Criticism (New York, 1969), p.†105.
- ⁵6. The Great Code, p.†66.
- ⁶7. This is a characteristic of almost all vernacular histories which follow a genealogical model.†Cf.†William J.†Sayers, 'The Beginning and Early Development of Old French Historiography,' (Ph.D.†Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1955), p.†174.
- ⁷8. R.†Howard Bloch, 'Étymologies et Généalogies:†Théories de la langue, liens de parenté et genre littéraire au XIIIe siècle,' Annales Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 36 (1981), p.†951.
- ⁸9. A point well made by Orest Ranum, Artisans of Glory Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-Century France (Chapel Hill, 1980), p.†5.
- ⁹13. There is a fascinating discussion of the use of metaphors of procreation and filiation in relation to Vico's concept of gentile history -- the history of the gens and gentes generated in time -- in Edward Said, 'On Repetition,' in The Literature of Fact, ed.†Angus Fletcher, (New York, 1976), pp.†135-58.
- ¹⁰14. Cf.†Claude Lévi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning, p.†38.
- ¹¹11. Now translated into English in Language, Counter-memory, Practice: selected essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. with an introduction by Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, 1977): 139-164.
- ¹²12. Michael Roth, 'Foucault on Discourse and History: A Style of Delegitimation,' in The Ironist's Cage Memory, Trauma and the Construction of History (New York, 1995), p. 75.

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13. Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,' p. 139-140
14. Ibid., p. 140.
15. Ibid., p. 142.
16. Ibid., pp. 144-145.
17. Ibid., p. 147.
18. Ibid., p. 145-146.
19. Ibid., p. 146.
20. Ibid., p. 146.
21. Ibid., p. 150.
22. "Il Faut Défendre la Société" (Cours au Collège de France [1975-1976]) (Paris, 1997), p. 10.
23. Ibid., p. 11.
24. 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,' p. 154.
25. On this see Michael Roth, 'Foucault on Discourse and History: A Style of Delegation,' p. 85.
26. "Il Faut Défendre la Société", p. 32. Au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècle il s'est produit un phénomène important: l'apparition -- il faudrait dire l'invention -- d'une nouvelle mécanique du pouvoir, qui a des procédures bien particulières, des instruments tout nouveaux, un appareillage très différent et qui, je crois, est absolument incompatible avec des rapports de souveraineté